An onboarding & ongoing home for trustee training.

A private school took 90 to 99 percent of its budget from public funds and was heavily regulated by the state, and the Court still held it was not a state actor.

For youThis is the load-bearing wall under the entire file. Constitutional rights restrain government; a private school is not the government. Public funding and heavy regulation, standing alone, do not convert you into a state actor.

Oregon's 1922 Compulsory Education Act required every child between eight and sixteen to attend a public school. A Catholic teaching order and a military academy sued and won. The Act “unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.” The famous line is “the child is not the mere creature of the State.” Note the ground: Fourteenth Amendment due process, not the First Amendment. The Religion Clauses had not yet been incorporated against the states in 1925.

For youThis is the case your school exists under. Private education is a protected liberty, and no state can compel every child into a public classroom.

Amish parents were fined for refusing to send their children to school past eighth grade. The Court held that compulsory attendance to age sixteen violated their Free Exercise rights, weighing a sincere and long-held religious way of life against the state's interest in two additional years of schooling.

For youYoder is the high-water mark for religious exemption from generally applicable education law, and it is narrower than it looks. The Court leaned hard on three centuries of Amish practice and on the fact that the children were already receiving vocational training. It is not a general license to opt out of education regulation on religious grounds.

Two private nonsectarian schools in Virginia refused to admit Black children. The Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a Reconstruction-era statute guaranteeing the same right to make and enforce contracts, reaches racially discriminatory admissions at private schools.

For youSection 1981 has no employee-count threshold, no funding trigger, and no state action requirement. It reaches you no matter how small you are and no matter how you are funded. Of everything in this file, this is the statute least likely to be on a head of school's radar and most absolute in its reach on race.

The IRS revoked the tax-exempt status of a religious university that barred interracial dating and marriage on doctrinal grounds. The Court upheld the revocation. An institution seeking a charitable exemption must serve a public purpose and not act contrary to established public policy, and the governmental interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education was compelling enough to outweigh the burden on religious exercise.

For youThis is the consequence case that pairs with Runyon. Runyon says the conduct is actionable. Bob Jones says your exemption is on the table. Both apply to race and neither turns on federal funding.

The New York Board of Regents composed a twenty-two-word nondenominational prayer and recommended it. A local board directed daily recitation. Students could stay silent or be excused. Still an Establishment Clause violation, “even if the prayer is denominationally neutral and pupils who wish to do so may remain silent or be excused.”

For youNothing here restricts your school. Engel restrains government. It is on this page because it is the case people reach for when they argue that your chapel requirement or your daily prayer is unconstitutional, and it does not say that.

A public high school football coach was disciplined for kneeling in personal prayer at midfield after games. The Court held the prayer was private speech protected by the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses, and used the occasion to discard the Lemon test in favor of an analysis grounded in historical practices and understandings.

For youThe direct holding is about a government employer, so it does not govern you. The indirect effect matters: the Establishment Clause arguments that used to be raised against religious expression in publicly connected settings got substantially weaker. If your school shares facilities, runs joint programs, or plays in a public league, the ground under those arrangements shifted in your favor.

Cheryl Perich was a called teacher with the formal title Minister of Religion, Commissioned. She completed synod theological study, passed an oral exam, and was elected by the congregation. She taught mostly secular subjects plus religion four days a week, led chapel about twice a year, and led daily prayer. She developed narcolepsy, took leave, and when she threatened an ADA suit the congregation rescinded her call, citing insubordination and the litigation threat itself as contrary to the synod's belief in internal dispute resolution. The Court held the Religion Clauses barred the suit outright.

For youThe ministerial exception is real, it is constitutional rather than statutory, it bars the claim regardless of the employer's actual motive, and it reaches state-law claims. It is also the single most overestimated protection in Christian school administration. Read the next card before you rely on it.

Two lay Catholic elementary teachers, neither holding the title minister. Both taught all subjects including religion, prayed with students, and prepared them for the sacraments. One brought an age claim, the other a disability claim after requesting leave for breast cancer treatment. The exception applied to both. “What matters, at bottom, is what an employee does.” The Hosanna-Tabor considerations are not a checklist, and no single factor, title included, controls.

For youThis is the case that widened the door, and it widened it based on function rather than credentials. A teacher who leads prayer, teaches religion, and forms students in the faith may be covered even with no title and thin formal training. Which cuts both ways: it is a real protection, and it means your job descriptions and your handbook language about religious duties are doing legal work whether you intended that or not.

Title VII's prohibition on discrimination “because of sex” encompasses sexual orientation and gender identity. But-for causation, applied to the individual rather than the group. Decided together with Altitude Express v. Zarda and Harris Funeral Homes v. EEOC.

For youStatutory, not constitutional. Students and trustees routinely file it next to the Religion Clause cases and it does not belong there. It reaches any employer with fifteen or more employees, funding irrelevant.

A co-director of guidance at a Catholic high school was not rehired after entering a same-sex marriage. The Seventh Circuit held the ministerial exception applied. She supervised counselors, sat on the Administrative Council, worked under a document titled Ministry Contract, and led prayer over the public address system. The exception barred all five of her claims, including two state-law torts.

For youThe most important non-Supreme-Court case in this file. It shows how far function-based analysis travels past the classroom, and it shows that the exception can defeat state-law claims, not just federal ones. It also shows what makes the difference: titles, contract language, and actual religious duties written down in advance.

A church music director alleged a hostile work environment based on sexual orientation, weight, and diabetes. The en banc Seventh Circuit held the ministerial exception bars hostile-work-environment claims by ministerial employees even where there was no tangible employment action such as firing or demotion.

For youNote what this covers: not the decision to end someone's employment, but the day-to-day treatment of a ministerial employee while they work for you. That is a much bigger category.

Section 702 permits a religious organization to prefer and to require co-religionists, and it is broad as to which positions. Not limited to jobs involving specifically religious activities. A Christian school may require its bookkeeper and its custodian to share the faith.

For youReligion only. It does nothing for race, color, sex, or national origin, and it does not touch the ADEA or the ADA at all.

Title VII and ADA Title I attach at fifteen or more employees, each working day for twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year. The weeks need not be consecutive and a part-time employee counts for the whole week. The ADEA attaches at twenty, a different number that is constantly conflated with fifteen. None of these depend on federal funding.

For youCount your employees the way the statute counts them, not the way your payroll report does. Schools sit right on the fifteen-employee line more often than they realize, and summer staffing can pull you across it.

Schools are a named enterprise under Department of Labor rules. Public or private, for-profit or nonprofit, it does not matter. The five-hundred-thousand-dollar annual dollar volume test that exempts small nonprofits does not apply to schools. The Equal Pay Act rides along through the FLSA on the same terms.

For youThere is no size at which minimum wage and overtime stop applying to you. This surprises small schools every single time, and it is the most common source of real, quantifiable liability in this entire file. Misclassified assistant coaches and salaried staff doing hourly work are where it shows up.

Cleveland's scholarship program paid up to $2,250 with priority to low-income families. Eighty-two percent of participating private schools were religiously affiliated and ninety-six percent of recipients enrolled in religious schools. Upheld. The program was neutral toward religion and aid reached religious schools “wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent private choice.”

For youThis is the case that makes voucher and scholarship participation constitutionally safe on the Establishment Clause side. It says nothing about the conditions a state may attach to its own money, which is where the actual fights happen now.

Missouri excluded a church preschool from a neutral grant program for resurfacing playgrounds with recycled tires, solely because the applicant was a church. The Court held that excluding an otherwise eligible recipient from a public benefit because of religious status violates the Free Exercise Clause.

For youThe start of the line of cases that flipped the default. For decades the question was whether a state could give religious schools public money. Now the question is whether a state may refuse.

Montana created a tax-credit scholarship program and its Department of Revenue barred religious schools under the state constitution's no-aid provision. Struck down. A state need not subsidize private education, but once it does it cannot disqualify some private schools solely because they are religious.

For youRoughly three dozen states have no-aid clauses in their constitutions, most of them nineteenth-century Blaine amendments. Espinoza is why those clauses no longer keep your school out of a scholarship program.

Maine paid private-school tuition for students in districts with no public high school, but required the schools to be nonsectarian. Struck down. Maine tried to distinguish Espinoza by arguing it was excluding religious use rather than religious status. The Court rejected the distinction.

For youThe completion of the line. A state cannot exclude your school for being religious, and it cannot exclude your school for teaching religion either. If your state runs a tuition or scholarship program, being a Christian school is not a lawful reason to keep you out.

Title IX attaches with federal financial assistance. The most-overlooked trigger for faith-based K-12 schools is participation in the National School Lunch Program or the Special Milk Program. USDA's own Title IX regulations at 7 C.F.R. Part 15a apply to every recipient of USDA financial assistance, and a school becomes a recipient when it signs a school food authority agreement with its state agency. Federal grants, Title I and IDEA pass-through funds, and E-Rate also trigger it.

For youAsk your business office one question: do we take any federal money, including lunch money? Most heads of school have never asked and assume the answer is no. And under the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, coverage is institution-wide. It does not stop at the cafeteria door.

FERPA attaches to funds from the U.S. Department of Education specifically. ED's position is that private and parochial K-12 schools “generally do not receive such funding and are, therefore, not subject to FERPA.” USDA lunch money triggers Title IX but not FERPA. A school can be Title IX-covered and FERPA-exempt at the same time.

For youBeing FERPA-exempt does not mean you have no records obligations. Three other sources create them. Promises in your handbook and enrollment agreement, which are contractually enforceable. State student-records statutes. And tort, including defamation, invasion of privacy, and negligent disclosure.

Students wore black armbands to protest Vietnam and were suspended. Student speech is protected in public schools unless it materially and substantially disrupts the work and discipline of the school.

For youThe single most misapplied case in private education. A parent, a student, or a trustee will cite it to argue your student has a free speech right against your school. Your student does not. The First Amendment restrains government, and you are not the government.

Ohio students were suspended for up to ten days without a hearing. The Court held that a public school suspension implicates a property interest in education and a liberty interest in reputation, so due process requires notice of the charges and an opportunity to respond.

For youYou do not owe a student constitutional due process. What you owe is whatever process your own handbook and enrollment agreement promised, and courts will hold you to that. Which means the danger in your discipline policy is not that it gives too little process. It is that it promises more process than you actually follow.

A public school administrator searched a student's purse. The Fourth Amendment applies to public school officials, but the standard is reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause, and no warrant is needed.

For youThe Fourth Amendment does not reach your search of a locker, a bag, or a phone, because you are not a state actor. Your limits come from your handbook, from state law, and from tort. Note the flip side: if you involve law enforcement, the analysis changes, because now a state actor is in the room.

The “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” banner at a school-supervised event. Public schools may restrict student speech reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.

For youIncluded so no one mistakes it for a grant of authority you need. You already have broader authority over student speech than any public school does, and you always did.

A cheerleader posted a profane Snapchat off campus on a weekend after failing to make varsity, and was suspended from the squad. The Court held a public school's interest in regulating off-campus speech is diminished, though not eliminated.

For youThis is the case someone will send you after you discipline a student for a social media post. It does not apply to you. But read the sentence anyway, because it is the fairness argument a family will make even when the legal argument fails, and you will be answering it in a conference room whether or not it is binding.

Your handbook is binding to the extent it is incorporated by reference into the signed enrollment agreement and not disclaimed. Well-drafted agreements incorporate the handbook, reserve the right to amend it unilaterally, and disclaim procedural entitlements. Faculty handbooks are the mirror image, where at-will disclaimers exist specifically to prevent contract formation, and courts generally enforce a conspicuous one.

For youDeference runs to substance, not to process. A court will not second-guess whether expelling that student was the right call. It will absolutely enforce a procedure you promised in writing and then skipped. Nearly all of your real exposure here is self-inflicted, and it lives in sentences your own handbook committee wrote.

Federal constitutional analysis is step one, not the whole answer. California Education Code § 48950 binds private secondary schools on student speech, with a religious-school carve-out at subsection (c). New Jersey reads its state constitution more broadly than the federal one under State v. Schmid.

For youBefore you conclude that a constitutional protection does not reach you, check whether your state has legislated one into place anyway. The answer genuinely differs by state.

A student alleged sexual harassment and coercion by a teacher. The Court held that money damages are available in a private action under Title IX.

For youThe case that turned Title IX from an administrative compliance matter into litigation exposure. Everything downstream, including Gebser and Davis, is about how hard those damages are to get.

A teacher had a sexual relationship with a student. The Court held that damages for teacher-on-student harassment require that an official with authority to take corrective action had actual notice and responded with deliberate indifference.

For youActual notice, not constructive notice, and it has to reach someone empowered to act. This is precisely why who receives a report at your school, and what that person is authorized to do about it, is a governance question and not a clerical one. Your reporting channel is a legal design decision.

A fifth grader endured months of sexual harassment by a classmate and the school did essentially nothing. The Court recognized liability for peer harassment where the school had actual knowledge, was deliberately indifferent, and the harassment was so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively denied the victim equal access to education.

For youA demanding standard, and note what it actually punishes. Not the harassment. Your response to it. A documented, prompt, reasonable response defeats a deliberate indifference claim even when the underlying conduct was serious and even when your response did not fully work.

Georgia's statute, O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5, is representative. It names school teachers, administrators, counselors, visiting teachers, social workers, and psychologists. The categories are occupational, with no public or private distinction anywhere in the statute. The timeline is immediate, and in no case later than twenty-four hours from the point there is reasonable cause to believe abuse has occurred. Reports go to a child welfare agency designated by DFCS, or failing that to police or the district attorney. Good-faith participation carries civil and criminal immunity. A required reporter who knowingly and willfully fails to report commits a misdemeanor.

For youGeorgia allows an employee who reports to the institution's designated person to be deemed to have fully complied. The designee then carries the statutory duty. Two consequences follow, and the second one should keep you up at night. An individual teacher discharges the duty internally, and your designee is a single point of failure. Name a backup and put it in writing.

The standard is the reasonably prudent educator, meaning the degree of supervision an ordinarily prudent teacher would maintain under the same or similar circumstances. Foreseeability does the work on both duty and proximate cause, weighing the age and capacity of the students, the nature of the risk, the size of the group, and the inherent danger of the activity. An intervening act does not cut off liability if the act itself was foreseeable.

For youHere is the reversal, and it is the most useful counterintuitive fact in this entire file. Every other page here says private schools are less regulated. This one inverts. Public schools in most states, Georgia included, have substantial governmental and official immunity plus damages caps. You have neither. Your tort exposure is higher than the public school down the road, not lower.

The pair that governs when a family must exhaust IDEA administrative procedures before suing under the ADA or Section 504.

For youIf you cite Fry, cite Perez with it. Read as a pair, not separately.

A school with 15 or more employees is fully bound by ADA Title I for employment. But religious entities are exempt from ADA Title III, public accommodations — and DOJ reads that exemption broadly, covering all activities of a religious entity, religious or secular. Its own manual's example is a congregation running a private school for members and nonmembers alike.

For youIf you are a religious school, you have a Title III exemption a non-sectarian independent school across town does not have. That is a real structural difference and most heads don't know they have it.

A Washington grandparent-visitation statute was unconstitutional as applied, because it gave no special weight to a fit parent's determination of a child's best interests.

For youThe modern citation for parental primacy — useful in your parent handbook and in disputes with non-custodial relatives or state agencies. It constrains courts and government, not your school's own policies.